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THE FUTURE OF ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION-The critical condition of
American industry, in the throes of an economic collapse affecting every class of
society, has naturally precipitated a series of attacks at every part of our industrial
structure against which the blame for this condition might be laid. Of these
attacks, one of the most severe has been directed against our anti-trust policy,'
The resultant exposure of the effects on industry of the application of this policy
may result in a basic change in a system of legislation that has withstood inter-
mittent assaults for over forty years. Although an economic depression can
never be attributed to a single cause, a time of depression may result in the
exposure of the faults latent in a particular part of the economic system. The
crippled state of American business has brought to light certain fundamental
faults of American anti-trust legislation.
The most striking characteristic of the state of our industries at the present
time is that in the majority of them, the productive capacity is far greater than
the consumptive requirements.' The development of business at such a rate as
to outstrip the needs of the consumer was brought about by a rapid improvement
of technique, marked by increasing mechanization of industry, combined with an
over-expansion of plants under the influence of the greatest period of inflation in
our history.3  Whether or not the consumptive needs will eventually increase
sufficiently to meet the present productive capacity, the potentialities of production
will during the next few years continue greatly to exceed the maximum demands
of consumption. In the face of such a situation, the policy indicated to restore
and preserve the normal relation of supply and demand so as to achieve a stabil-
ization of industry is necessarily one of regulation. If the existing units of busi-
ness are to survive, it is imperative that their combined production be restricted
to consumptive needs, and that each unit be assigned its share in the total produc-
tion. It is also important that prices proportionate to the marginal cost of pro-
duction be maintained. The American policy of prohibiting self-regulation of
industry and enforcing uncontrolled competition has been persistently preserved
despite these conditions. Production continues to exceed demand; price-cutting
is followed by the failure of the weaker concerns. The direct results of unregu-
lated production and merchandising are the further demoralization of industries,
increase in unemployment, and, in some instances, the premature exhaustion of
natural resources.
The state of the oil industry best serves as an illustration of all of these
results. The potential oil production of the United States is four times the
'See for instance Marcosson, What Price the Sherman Law? SATURDAY EVENING POST,
Feb. 21, 1931, p. 6; Barrows, Oil: An Industry Drowning in a Flood of Laws (1931) 84 RE-
vlmw oF REvIEws 58; Levy, Revision, of Anti-Trust Laws, OrrIcrAL Bum. Am. SUPPLY
AND MACH. MFRS. Ass'N, Nov. 3o, 1931; Wol, Organized Labor Demands Repeal of Sher-
man, Act (193o) CXLVII ANNALS 185. See also the reports on the recent symposia on the
anti-trust laws at Columbia University (published by Commerce Clearing House, 1932) and
at New York University (RELATION OF LAW AND BUSINESS, 1932).
I Doriot, Our Sick Industries (93) 20 YALE REvEw 442, 448; Wolman, Unemploy-
ment (1930) 20 YALE REVIEW 234, 237; Levy, A Contrast between the Anti-Trust Laws of
Foreign Countries and of the United States (1930) CXLVII ANNALS 125, 135.
'Doriot, op. cit. supra note 2. For a survey showing the rate of increase of produc-
tion in various industries see Thomas, The Growth of Production and the Rising Standard
of Living (1926) 12 AcADEMY OF POI SCL PROC. 6.51. For a discussion of state attempts




present demand,4 yet new wells are drilled at the average of 200 a day,5 and the
estimated daily production is nearly three million barrels. 6 Where adjoining
wells tap the same pool, each well-owner joins the race to drain all the oil he can
befcre the pool runs dry.' Old wells cannot compete with the flush production
of new drillings and are abandoned, with the probable loss of the oil in the aban-
doned wells.8 The price wars caused by these conditions are notorious. Many
producers are driven out of business, unable to meet the prices set by their com-
petitors. Although the consumers profit momentarily by the lowered prices, the
true nature of their profit has been aptly pointed out:
"The public benefits in this exactly as beachcombers profit by a ship-
wreck. Shipwrecks are not, however, highly regarded as bases of prosperity,
and it requires only the merest common sense to see that if disaster overtakes
one member of America's family of basic industries, the others are bound to
suffer." 1
It is the purpose of this note to show to what extent the American anti-trust policy
has prevented the alleviation of these conditions, and to indicate the nature of such
changes in that policy as should bring about the stabilization of industry. For this
purpose it is necessary to analyze the effects of the application of the laws that
embody the American policy.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, has enunciated the basic prin-
ciple underlying both federal and state anti-trust statutes:
"According to them, competition, not combination, should be the law of
trade. If there is evil in this, it should be accepted as less than that which
may result from the unification of interests, and the power such unification
gives." 10
The federal 11 legislative machinery is so constructed as to make this principle
literally enforceable. The Sherman Law,1 2 prohibiting under pain of severe
criminal and civil penalties every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint
of interstate or foreign trade, is supplemented by the Clayton Act,"3 which defines
certain practices as restraints of trade and extends injunctive relief to individuals,
'Marcosson, op. cit. supra note I.
'Barrows, op. cit. supra note I.0Steele, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Oil Industry (193o) CXLVII ANNALS 77, SO.
Barrows, op. cit. supra note I. The proposed device to correct this practice is unitiza-
tion, i. e., operating as a unit the group of wells tapping the same pool. But for the legality
of agreements apportioning the output of competitors see United States v. duPont de
Nemours Co., 188 Fed. 127 (C. C. Del. i9ii) and United States Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co.. 163 Fed. 701 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i9o8).
'Steele, op. cit. supra note 6, at 8o.
'Barrows, op. cit. supra note I.
"National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U. S. I5, 129, 25 Sup. Ct. 379, 382 (9o5).
uA full discussion of state anti-trust laws would properly form part of this note. Limi-
tation of space forbids the inclusion of the exact provisions of state legislation, but in the
development of the subject, comments will be made on the parallel attitude of the federal
and state legislatures and courts to the fundamental problems involved. There is a marked
tendency on the part of the states to adopt the policies followed by the federal government.
In most states the statutes are much more specific in their prohibitions than the federal
statutes. In a few states, notably Pennsylvania, there are no anti-trust statutes, but in
these jurisdictions the policies followed are very similar to those in the other states, the
only difference being that agreements are declared void (under common law rules) and
there are no criminal provisions. For a good outline of state anti-trust enactments, see
DAviEs, TRUST LAws AND UNFAIR COMPrTON (1916) 143-230. See also JaNxs AND
CLAx, THE TRUST PROBLEM (1917) 241-253.
"26 STAT. 209 (08go), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1928).
"38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §12 (1928).
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and by the Pcderai Trade Commission1 Act,14 which provides a commission to
investigate alleged violations of the Sherman Law and to suppress unfair methods
of competition, by the Act declared unlawful. For the purposes of the present
discussion, the operation of this machinery upon individual monopolistic corpo-
rations is not important. The individual units of business are experiencing com-
parative security from restriction. 15 It is the influence of the legislation upon
the efforts at cooperation among the separate units of business that presents the
problem here treated.
In dealing with attempts.at industrial cooperation, the attitude of the courts
has been uncompromising. Their steadfast purpose has been to prevent any
concerted action calculated to impede free competition, whether or not the at-
tempted combination or agreement was aimed at a worthy purpose, achieved a
beneficial result, or imposed only reasonable restrictions on competition.'" An
examination of the decisions reveals the thoroughness of their accomplishment of
this'purpose.
The two methods of stabilizing an industry suffering from the effects of
overproduction are briefly, the curtailment of production, and the setting of mini-
mum prices. Wherever the courts have detected in agreements or combinations
the design to effect either of these results, they have declared them illegal. The
direct limitation of the production or sale of goods by combination or agreement
among producers or distributors has been pronounced illegal under the provisions
of federal " and state ' anti-trust legislation; the same is true of agreements
designed to achieve this result indirectly, by such devices as the apportionment of
output 19 or the division of territory 20 among producers or distributors. Attempts
to fix prices in combination, no matter with what purpose, and regardless of the
" 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §41 (1928).
'Individual corporations in the form of mergers have received all the benefit of the
Supreme Court's "rule of reason" pronounced in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, o2
U. S. i, 31 Sup. Ct.5o2 (i9ii) and American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. io6,
31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911). The great mergers such as those approved in United States v.
International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 47 Sup. Ct. 748 (1927) and United States v.
United States Steel Co., 2.51 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (192o), being found to be combina-
tions that do not unreasonably restrain trade, enjoy without restriction the Power directly
to control the prices and rate of output in the industries which they dominate. Among
independent producers, on the other hand, any direct attempts at price or output control
are prohibited whether reasonable or not. (See infra notes 17-23). The injustice of this
discrimination has been clearly pointed out: Butler, Needed Changes in the Anti-Trust Laws
(193o) CXLVII ANNALS 89, 190; see also Butler, A Constructive Anti-Trust Law (193o)
r3 ACADEMY OF Poll Sci. PRoC. 156, 159. For examples of the opposing views as to the
desirability of mergers, see Note (i93o) 79 U. or PA. L. REv. 602, and Farrm, TnE MAS-
QUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931).
"'A combination is not excused because it was induced by good motives, or produced
good results"-Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66, 86, 37 Sup. Ct. 353, 359 (1916). See also
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1912).
"1 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct 276 (i9o.S) ; United States v.
McAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 19o6); Gibbs v. McNeeley, 118
Fed. i2o (C. C. A. 9th, 19o2). See Coronado Coal Co. v. United Iron Workers, 268 U. S.
295, 31o, 4s Sup. Ct. 551, 556 (1925).
"5State v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 26o Mo. 212, i6p S. W. 145 (1914) ; Fisher v. Flick-
inger Wheel Co., 7 Ohio C. C. (N. s.) 533 (19o6). Agreements or combinations for the
purpose of limiting output are expressly prohibited by the constitutions of six states and
by the statutes of twenty-eight others. DAVIES, op. cit. supra note II, 179.
"United States Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 7; United States
v. duPont de Nemours Co.,-supra note 7; Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass
Jobbers Ass'n, 152 Fed. 864 (C. C. A. 3d, i9o7).
" Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (180);
Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass Jobbers Ass'n, supra note 1g. For a lead-
ing state case declaring the illegality of the apportionment of output and the division of
territory, see Vulcan Powder Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 96 Cal. 5io (1892).
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reasonableness of the prices fixed, have been consistently defeated by federal 21
and state 22 courts. Price-fixing agreements per sc are illegal and prohibited.
As a corollary to this rule, the division of earnings or profits between competing
concerns is illegal.23 In the leading federal decision on price-fixing, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the judicial and legislative policy toward all such agreements:
"Whatever difference of opinion there may be among economists as to
the social and economic desirability of an unrestrained competitive system,
it cannot be doubted that the Sherman Law and the judicial decisions inter-
preting it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is best pro-
tected from the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of
competition." 24
The vice in the unqualified assumption that "the public interest is best pro-
tected . . . by the maintenance of competition" is that the public interest is
identified with the consumer interest alone. Certainly it is to the public interest
that industries be preserved from destruction. Yet attempts at cooperation
intended not to exploit the consumer but to save an industry from the effects of
overproduction, price-cutting, or exhaustion of resources 25 are categorically pro-
hibited because they employ devices for the reduction of the free play of compe-
tition, and are equally well adapted for the exploitation of the consumer. The
true public interest involved in the cooperative agreements of industry has long
been recognized in England, and this recognition forms a part of the industrial
policy in that country:
"Unquestionably the combination in question was one the purpose of
which was to regulate supply and keep up prices. But an ill-regulated supply
and unremunerative prices may, in point of fact, be disadvantageous to the
public. Such a-state-of things may, if not-controlled, drive manufacturers
out of business, or lower wages, and so cause unemployment and labour dis-
turbance. It must always be a question of circumstances whether a com-
bination of manufacturers in a particular trade is an evil from a public point
of view." 26
'United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377 (1927) ; Keogh
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 26o U. S. 156, 43 Sup. Ct. 47 (1922); Standard Sanitary
Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 16; Live Poultry Dealers Protective A.ss'n v. United
States, 4 F. (2d) 840 (C. C. A. 2d, i924).
'People v. Jevne, 179 Cal. 621, 178 Pac. 517 (1919) ; Harding v. American Glucose
Co., 182 Ill. 551, 55 N. E. 577 (899) ; Texas Standard Oil Co. v. Adoue, 83 Tex. 650, 19
S. W. 274 (1892). For state constitutional and statutory provisions against price-fixing
agreements see DAviEs, op. cit. supra note ii, 168-178.
' Continental Wallpaper Co. v. Voight, 212 U. S. 227, 29 Sup. 2,o (9o9) ; Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, supra note 20; United States v. McAndrews & Forbes
Co., supra note 17.
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co,, supra note 21 at 397, 47 Sup. Ct. at 379.
'No case has yet been before the federal courts in which the validity of an agreement
to limit production designed as a strictly conservation measure has been involved. There
have been recent expressions of opinion that such an agreement would be declared legal;
see The Anti-Trust Laws (1931) 84 REvIEw OF REVIEws 64; Donovan, American Industry
and the Anti-Trust Laws (address before Harvard Business School, Nov. 20, 193). The
western states are strong advocates of permitting such agreements, and a test case may soon
arise regarding the legality of the Wisconsin Lumbermen's Agreement to curtail production.
There is no expression on the part of the courts leading to the belief that they would hold
such an agreement valid; the contrary would be inferred from the language of the Supreme
Court-that the good motives inducing an agreement are immaterial. See cases supra note
i6. The most prevalent opinion is that conservation agreements could not be sanctioned
under the existing laws. See Hervey, Anti-Trust Laws and the Conservation of Minerals
(193o) CXLVII ANNALS 67.
- Northwestern Salt Co., Ltd. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co., Ltd., [1914] A. C. 461, 469.
See also Crown Milling Co., Ltd. v. The King, [1927] A. C. 394, and Attorney General
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The short-sighted policy at the base of the American system was adopted at a
time when fear of the activities of great monopolies led to legislation condemning
combination regardless of its purpose.2 ' The absolute prohibitions of that legis-
lation are still in effect despite fundamental economic changes.
It cannot be said that the courts have been blind to .the desirability of allevi-
ating the effects of this policy. In some recent decisions there is evidence of their
recognition of the social utility and desirability of industrial cooperation. Indus-
try was greatly encouraged by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Maple
Flooring Association 28 and Cement Manufacturers Association 29 cases, which
for the first time sanctioned the activities of trade associations." Although these
decisions evidenced a more lenient view towards cooperative activities, 31 subse-
quent developments have discounted their significance. The opinions were cau-
tiously worded and the limitation of their effect definitely stated. They went in
fact no farther than to decide that the gathering and dissemination of trade infor-
mation relating to the cost and volume of production, previous selling prices and
stocks on hand were legal only if such information was exchanged "without
reaching any agreement or concerted action with respect to prices or production". 
2
The later decisions of the Court evidence no weakening of the rule that any direct
action toward price or production control is illegal.-2 In the face of existing
legislation the courts have been powerless to sanction concerted action designed
to achieve those ends. The permitted activities, helpful though they may be, fall
far short of the needs of industry. The ineffectiveness of a voluntary agreement
to curtail production is demonstrated by the probable failure of the "Sunday
Shutdown" agreement between oil producers which seems likely to be abandoned
because of the impossibility of insuring uniform observance.2 4 It has been justly
said of the activity of trade associations:
of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co., Ltd., [1913] A. C. 781. For a criticism of the
American system as contrasted with the anti-trust policy of other nations, see Levy, op. cit.
supra note 2.
' See Evans, The Supreme Court and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (191o) 59 U. OF
PA. L. Rav. 61, 66.
2Maple Flooring Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578 (1925).
' Cement Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586 (925).
'The pronouncement of these decisions elicited this sanguine prediction from Mr. Gil-
bert H. Montague: "Looking into the future, and seeing how the business cycle can be
brought under the control of society, I can see all the tremendous social and psychological
results which may follow. Business can be maintained on present or even better levels,
peaks of over-speculation can be cut down, valleys of undue depression can be filled up, ex-
tremes of feast and famine can be avoided, and industry can, with reasonable assurance, be
stabilized on fairer price levels."-Montague, New Opportunities and Responsibilities of
Trade Associations as a Result of Recent United States Supreme Court Decisions (1926)
it AcAim y OF Pot ScI. PRoc. 579, 582.
"Especially in view of the fact that these cases' reversed the holdings of two earlier
cases involving factual situations almost identical: United States v. American Linseed Oil
Co., 262 U. S. 371, 43 Sup. Ct. 607 (1922) and American Column Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup. Ct. 417 (921). See Probst, The Failure of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Law (1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. Rtv. 122.
Maple Flooring Ass'n v. United States, supra note 28 at 586, 45 Sup. Ct. at 586. In
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra note 21 at 400, 47 Sup. Ct. at 38o, the Court
said: "The decisions in Maple Flooring Association v. United States and in Cement Man-
ufacturers Protective Association v. United States were made on the assumption that any
agreement for price-fixing, if found, would have been illegal as a matter of law." It was
so well recognized at the time these cases were decided that they did not pretend to give
any color of legality to price or production agreements [See, for instance, Donovan, The
Legality of Trade Associations (1926) i1 AcADEmy OF POt. Sci. PROC. 571; Probst, op.
cit. supra note 31] that it is difficult to account for the optimistic view taken by Mr. Mon-
tague and others of the impetus cooperative acivities would gain from these decisions.
SFederal Trade Comm. v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U. S. 52, 47 Sup.
Ct. 255 (1927) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra note 21.
"4New York Times, January 3, 1932, 2d news section, p. o.
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"Although this is a very useful procedure, it falls far short of the nat-
ural and simpler course of permitting competitors to put a stop to senseless
practices of excessive competition by mutual agreement." 35
The course of legislation in the last two decades exhibits a growing realiza-
tion by the legislators of the unsoundness of a policy that categorically condemns
combination restraining trade. A brief reference to some of the enactments will
show an increasing tendency to grant legislative exemption to certain classes from
the operation of the Shermzan Law.
The protection of the domestic producer in his competition with foreign trade
raised a serious problem. Although foreign competitors have no advantages in
our domestic markets, where their acts are subject to the provisions of the anti-
trust laws,3 6 they enjoy a tremendous advantage abroad, since they are not as a
rule subject to restrictions against combination,37 whereas an American exporter
is prohibited from doing in this country any act contrary to the anti-trust laws,
though the act has to do solely with his foreign trade.38 The Webb-Pornerene
Act 3 9 was designed to remedy this situation. The Act permits the formation of
associations of exporters and exempts their agreements from the provisions of
the anti-trust laws, provided their agreements have no direct effect on domestic
prices. These associations must, however, market their products under the trade
name adopted by the cartel organization; the benefit of the use of an individual
trade-mark is denied to a member of the association. This restriction leaves the
exporter under a serious handicap.
By the terms of the Clayton Act,40 labor and agricultural organizations are
declared not to be illegal combinations; and it is provided that nothing in the anti-
trust laws shall be construed as prohibiting the members of such organizations
from "lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof". The Act also pur-
ports to limit the use of the injunction in labor disputes to cases where irreparable
harm is threatened, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, and to legalize
strikes, picketing, and boycotting. In practice, these clauses for the protection
of labor are of little importance, since the federal courts have without hesitation
enjoined any activities of labor organizations which were found to 'have the direct
effect of restraining interstate trade or of creating a monopoly. 41  This course
has been followed by the state courts with regard to labor activities restraining
intrastate trade.42  Organized labor for some years has been the most ardent• 11"43
advocate of repeal of existing anti-trust laws.
On the other hand the right of agricultural organizations to make cooperative
agreements has been greatly extended by the Capper-Volstead Act,4 4 which per-
mits farmers, ranchmen, dairymen, and nut or fruit growers to act together in
collectively marketing their products and to make the necessary contracts and
Levy, op. cit. supra note i.
'United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry., 228 U. S. 87, 33 Sup. Ct. 443 (1913).
Copland, Some Reciprocal Effects of Our Anti-Trust Laws, With Special Reference
to Australia (igo) CXLVII ANNALS 117; Levy, op. cit. supra note 2; Kirsh, Foreign
Trade Functions of Trade Associations: The Legal Aspects (1928) 76 U. op PA. L. REy. 891.
'United States v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 15.
M 40 STAT. ,516 (igi), .I5 U. S. C. A. §6I (1928).
'Supra note 13.
,"Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stonecutters Ass'n of North America, 274
U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522 (1927) ; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443,
41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921) ; Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522, 3.5 Sup. Ct. 170 (1915) ; Vandell
v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
,Shaughnessy v. Jordan, 184 Ind. 499, 111 N. E. 622 (1916); Overland Publishing
Co. v. Crocker, 193 Cal. 1O9, 222 Pac. 812 (1924) 1 Seubert v. Reiff, 98 Misc. 402, 164 N. Y.
Sup. 522 (1917) ; Gildehaus v. Busse, ig Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 263 (1916).
S In 192.5 the American Federation of Labor declared for repeal of the Sherman Law
and has been agitating for the same since that time. Woll, op. cit. supra note i, at 187.
"412 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. §291 (1928).
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agreements to that end. Their agreements are subject only to the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture, who may restrain an association from "unduly" causing
the enhancement of prices.
Cooperative agreements and combinations have been sanctioned in other
fields. By the Merchant Marine Act of 1916,15 shippers are exempted from the
provisions of the Sherman Law. The Transportation Act of 1920 4 encourages
a program of combination between carriers, subject to the approval of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission .4  There are some economists who advocate the
adaptation of our anti-trust policy to present industrial conditions by the further
extension of exemptive legislation. 8 Such a course seems neither logical nor in
accord with American concepts. It is not a sound course to enunciate a policy
forbidding all combination on the one hand and then to enact a series of laws on
the other hand the effect of which is to declare that the policy from which they
grant exemption is unsound and inapplicable in a particular field. Furthermore,
a system of class legislation is certainly contrary to American principles." The
needed changes cannot be attained by compromise. Our economic situation
requires a basic alteration of an outworn policy.
There are a few who would repeal the Sherman Law. It is universally
respected for the part it has played in the suppression of monopolies which were
operating not only to exploit the consumer but to stamp out all competition. Its
prohibition of such combination still expresses a fundamental American principle.
The nature of the change required is a lessening of the application of the pro-
hibition against combination to make possible combinations or agreements that
would restrain trade in the literal sense, but only to the extent necessary for the
stabilization of industry. A widely advocated form of amendment is one that
would provide a commission or legislative court with the power to give advisory
opinions on the legality of proposed agreements, and to exempt from the criminal
provisions of the anti-trust laws the parties to agreements approved by the com-
mission, pending final approval or disapproval by the courts.50 While such an
administrative change would have a helpful effect in clarifying the laws and in
encouraging agreements which are not attempted because of the fear of criminal
penalties if the agreements be adjudged illegal, it is subject to the serious objection
that it could not extend to parties the power to make the type of agreements so
urgently required. Since both price-fixing and production curtailment are clearly
"39 STAT. 728 (1916), 45 U. S. C. A. § 44 (1928).
4"41 STAT. 474 (I92O), 49 U. S. C. A. § I (1928). For an account of the formation
of railroad combinations under this authority, see Waterman, The Progress of Unification
(1930) 13 ACADEMY OF FOL. Sci. PRoc. 369.
1 It is not pretended that the foregoing is a complete catalog of federal exemptive legis-
lation. The examples are chosen to illustrate the impossibility of uniform enforcement
of the federal anti-trust laws. For reference to a substantial part of the federal legisla-
tion that has affected the anti-trust policy see DAviEs, op. cit. supra note II, 123-142. For
a discussion of the tendency to pass exemptive legislation see Fernley, Special Privilege
under our Federal Anti-Trust Laws (193o) CXLVII ANNA.s 32.
"This suggestion has been most commonly made with reference to industries requir-
ing the protection of natural resources. See Hervey, op. cit. supra note 25. See also com-
ment on the Walsh Bill, infra note 5o.
"Fernley, op. cit. supra note 47, at 36.
' In one form or another, the establishment of a commission has been recommended
by the following authorities: Merritt, What the Anti-Trust Laws Should Be (193o)
CXLVII ANNALS i9.1; Donovan, The Need for a Commerce Court (i93o) CXLVII AN-
NALS 138; Butler, Needed Changes in the Anti-Trust Laws, op. cit. supra note. 15. The
extension of very great powers to the Federal Trade Commission is proposed by the Walsh
Bill, introduced in the Senate January 25, 1932, which would grant the Commission the
power to approve "co-operative contracts for curtailment of production and for other acts
to avoid ruinous competition", subject to revocation by the Commission when no longer
in the public interest. It would seem that this bill goes too far, as it gives an admin-
istrative body plenary power to exempt from the express provisions of existing legislation,
and is too bureaucratic a measure to be likely of approval.
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and explicitly prohibited by the existing laws,51 the commission would have no
other course than to advise against the legality of any agreement of this nature
which might be submitted to it. It is clear, therefore, that an amendment that
will correct the present effect of the laws must be aimed at the Sherman Law
itself. Such an amendment is now in the hands of the Judiciary Committee of
Congress ; 52 this bill, sponsored by the National Civic Federation, goes directly
to the root of the situation. After .a preamble stating inter alia that decisions
interpreting the Sherman Law "have disregarded, ignored, or negatived the pres-
ervation and the welfare of American industries against the effects of excessive
competition" and that "the public welfare is best promoted not only by a proper
safeguarding of consumers against excessive sales prices . . . but also by a
proper safeguarding of Arfierican industries and the producers, workers, and all
other persons engaged in such industries, from the effects produced by excessive
or ruinous competition" the bill sets forth the following amendment:
Sec. 9. That the words "in restraint of trade", wherever used in this
Act, shall be deemed and interpreted to mean only such restraint of trade as,
having due regard to the interests of producers, workers, consumers, and
distributors, shall be to the detriment of the public.
This amendment has been recently criticised on the ground that it amounts to a
virtual repeal of the Sherman Law:
"The effect of such a statute, as construed by the British courts,53 is to
permit agreements between and consolidation of competitors to the point of
complete monopoly. Competition as the regulator of prices and production
disappears and no government control of prices is substituted. The reason-
ableness of prices fixed by the combination would be subject to judicial inves-
tigation, it is true, but only when a discouraged prosecutor might be moved to
action by some especially oppressive action by the monopoly." 54
Partly to meet this objection, partly to facilitate the formation of agreements, it
is submitted that the best solution to the whole problem would be a twofold action:
the adoption of the above amendment to the Shernum Law, and in addition the
adoption of the amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act sponsored by
the American Bar Association,55 giving the Commission advisory powers over
trade agreements and the power to grant immunity from the penalties of the
Sherman Law to the parties acting under approved agreements.
The principal obstacles in the way of this solution are practical. The magni-
tude of the task before the Commission in weighing the complex effects of pro-
posed agreements and in adjusting the conflicting interests involved would be
tremendous; the element of favoritism in its decisions could not be entirely
excluded, and the approval or disapproval of agreements would inevitably be
accompanied by "log-rolling" and by occasional yielding to "interests". The
problems presented by one trade agreement would be complicated by the necessity
of considering the inter-relation of the industries. The work of the Commission
would include all the difficulties met by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
but multiplied a hundred times. Though these difficulties are very real, the
present situation of industry demands a decisive step, and it is submitted that it
See cases mpra notes 17-23.
7ist Congress, 3d Session, H. R. 17360.
The author refers to the case of Attorney General of Australia v. Adelaide Steam-
ship Co., Ltd., supra note 26.
r1 CLARx, THE FEDERAL Tnusr POLICY (1931) 292.
' The Butler Bill, now before Congress. For a detailed description of this bill and its
probable effect see Butler, Needed Changes in the Anti-Trust Laws, supra note 15.
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would be far better to take the step indicated, in spite of the difficulties of its
application, than to abandon industry to its fate. The author of the proposed
amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act defended it several years ago: 56
"If objection be made that to grant this additional authority to an admin-
istrative agency is to put more government in business, I reply that the Sher-
man Law puts more government in business than all other statutes combined,
and that to grant this additional power would take government out of business
to an extent that we are now able to appreciate."
The enactment into law of these two bills would have the result of opening
the way to all the agreements necessary to achieve a proper stabilization of busi-
ness, without impairing the present safeguards against monopoly. The parties to
agreements would, of course, still be subject to the existing criminal and civil
penalties if they acted without the approval of the Commission. The example of
the federal government in adopting such legislation would doubtless be followed
in most of the states. Of all of the suggested remedies, it would seem that in
these two bills will be found the proper policy for the regulation of industry under
the conditions of today.
W.W.W.
'Butler, Amending the Anti-Trust Laws (1926) iI AcAmm Y oF POL. Sc. PRoc. 655,
659.
